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Meaning and the Afterlife, draft; comments welcome
Argues that "the meaning of life" should not be dismissed as nonsense. Instead, the recent origin of the phrase supports an interpretation on which human life could have a secular meaning, one that depends on progress towards justice, and thus depends on us.
Argues that "the meaning of life" should not be dismissed as nonsense. Instead, the recent origin of the phrase supports an interpretation on which human life could have a secular meaning, one that depends on progress towards justice, and thus depends on us.
Proleptic Grief, draft; comments welcome
Argues that the rationality of grief is not a function of love and the reasons for grief; it turns on the emotional reality of grief itself. This explains the illusion that grief should never end, the impression that, if all we love is transient, nothing really matters, and the view that we should grieve the future death of those we love much as we would grieve them when they die.
Argues that the rationality of grief is not a function of love and the reasons for grief; it turns on the emotional reality of grief itself. This explains the illusion that grief should never end, the impression that, if all we love is transient, nothing really matters, and the view that we should grieve the future death of those we love much as we would grieve them when they die.
Freedom and the Will, draft; comments welcome
Argues, following Rogers Albritton, that compulsion does not involve a deficit of freedom that distinctively afflicts the will. Defends a conditional analysis of freedom, a partial theory of strength and weakness of will, and the truth of Descartes’ thesis that the will is “so free in its nature that it cannot be constrained.”
Argues, following Rogers Albritton, that compulsion does not involve a deficit of freedom that distinctively afflicts the will. Defends a conditional analysis of freedom, a partial theory of strength and weakness of will, and the truth of Descartes’ thesis that the will is “so free in its nature that it cannot be constrained.”
Murdoch on Misunderstanding, draft; comments welcome
Argues for a deflationary reading of Iris Murdoch on the privacy and idiosyncrasy of moral thought and weighs the implications of her view for the epistemology of ethics and other minds. Ends by asking how far Murdoch’s insights can be extricated from the more radical aspects of her position.
Argues for a deflationary reading of Iris Murdoch on the privacy and idiosyncrasy of moral thought and weighs the implications of her view for the epistemology of ethics and other minds. Ends by asking how far Murdoch’s insights can be extricated from the more radical aspects of her position.
What is a Right?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming
Argues for a theory of natural rights on which they are explained in terms of reasons supplied by rational consent. This theory solves a puzzle that defeats alternative views, including standard will and interest theories, the demand theory of rights, and the view that rights are irreducible or primitive.
Argues for a theory of natural rights on which they are explained in terms of reasons supplied by rational consent. This theory solves a puzzle that defeats alternative views, including standard will and interest theories, the demand theory of rights, and the view that rights are irreducible or primitive.
Human Nature, History, and the Limits of Critique, European Journal of Philosophy 32 (March 2024)
Argues that ethical knowledge derives from human nature, where this is not the essence of the species but natural history as socially-historically determined. Although it does not lead to social relativism, this argument limits the scope of social critique. As ideology becomes “total,” critique can only be immanent; to this extent, Adorno and the Frankfurt School are right.
Argues that ethical knowledge derives from human nature, where this is not the essence of the species but natural history as socially-historically determined. Although it does not lead to social relativism, this argument limits the scope of social critique. As ideology becomes “total,” critique can only be immanent; to this extent, Adorno and the Frankfurt School are right.
Other People, Sarah Buss and Nandi Theunissen, eds., Rethinking the Value of Humanity (Oxford 2023)
Argues for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.
Argues for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.
What is Morality?, Philosophical Studies 179 (April 2022); prepublication draft
Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.
Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.
"The Colour out of Space": Lovecraft on Induction, Philosophy and Literature 45 (April 2021); prepublication draft
Argues for a reading of H. P. Lovecraft’s 1927 short story, "The Colour out of Space," as an affective response to the problem of induction. Lovecraft weighs the meaning of our epistemic frailty, drawing on George Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. His writing elicits inductive vertigo, the fear that our concepts fail to carve nature at the joints.
Argues for a reading of H. P. Lovecraft’s 1927 short story, "The Colour out of Space," as an affective response to the problem of induction. Lovecraft weighs the meaning of our epistemic frailty, drawing on George Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. His writing elicits inductive vertigo, the fear that our concepts fail to carve nature at the joints.
Ignorance, Beneficence, and Rights, Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (February 2020); prepublication draft
Argues that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to 'specificity': it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.
Argues that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to 'specificity': it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.
Going Deep: Baseball and Philosophy, Sharon Marcus and Caitlin Zaloom, eds., Think in Public (Columbia 2019)
Argues, only partly tongue-in-cheek, that baseball is the most philosophical of games: like philosophy at its best, it harmonizes meaning with meticulous analysis. (First appeared online in Public Books.)
Argues, only partly tongue-in-cheek, that baseball is the most philosophical of games: like philosophy at its best, it harmonizes meaning with meticulous analysis. (First appeared online in Public Books.)
Humanism, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (Winter 2018)
Argues for a form of humanism on which we have reason to care about human beings that we do not have to care about other animals and human beings have rights against us other animals lack. Humanism respects the equal worth of those born with severe congenital cognitive disabilities. I address the charge of 'speciesism' and explain how being human is an ethically relevant fact.
Argues for a form of humanism on which we have reason to care about human beings that we do not have to care about other animals and human beings have rights against us other animals lack. Humanism respects the equal worth of those born with severe congenital cognitive disabilities. I address the charge of 'speciesism' and explain how being human is an ethically relevant fact.
Must Consequentialists Kill?, Journal of Philosophy 115 (February 2018)
Argues that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centred restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.
Argues that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centred restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.
Hume on Practical Reason, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays (Oxford 2016)
Argues that Hume was a sceptic about practical reason only on a rationalist account of what it would have to be. (An earlier version of this essay appeared in Philosophical Perspectives 18: 365-389.)
Argues that Hume was a sceptic about practical reason only on a rationalist account of what it would have to be. (An earlier version of this essay appeared in Philosophical Perspectives 18: 365-389.)
Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays (Oxford 2016)
Argues that we do not act intentionally 'under the guise of the good.' This makes it hard to explain why akrasia is distinctively irrational, but this is no objection since it is just as hard to explain on the opposing view. Ends with a problem of akrasia for ethical rationalists.
Argues that we do not act intentionally 'under the guise of the good.' This makes it hard to explain why akrasia is distinctively irrational, but this is no objection since it is just as hard to explain on the opposing view. Ends with a problem of akrasia for ethical rationalists.
Anscombe on Practical Knowledge, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays (Oxford 2016)
Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
Introduction: Practical Knowledge, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays (Oxford 2016)
Argues that action theory should be modestly, not radically, reductive: it should offer a non-circular account of what it is to act intentionally, and for reasons, in terms of action, causality, mental states, etc., not an account that makes no appeal to agency at all. The essay goes on to sketch my present views on practical knowledge, acting for reasons, and the relationship between action theory and ethics.
Argues that action theory should be modestly, not radically, reductive: it should offer a non-circular account of what it is to act intentionally, and for reasons, in terms of action, causality, mental states, etc., not an account that makes no appeal to agency at all. The essay goes on to sketch my present views on practical knowledge, acting for reasons, and the relationship between action theory and ethics.
Retrospection, Philosophers' Imprint 16 (August 2016)
Argues from nostalgia, affirmation, and regret to a principle of 'specificity': it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide you with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist.
Argues from nostalgia, affirmation, and regret to a principle of 'specificity': it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide you with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist.
Selfish Reasons, Ergo 2 (July 2015)
Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
The Ethics of Existence, Philosophical Perspectives 28 (December 2014)
Argues that inadvisable procreative acts should often be affirmed in retrospect. This shift is not explained by attachment or love but by the moral impact of existence.
Argues that inadvisable procreative acts should often be affirmed in retrospect. This shift is not explained by attachment or love but by the moral impact of existence.
The Midlife Crisis, Philosophers' Imprint 14 (November 2014)
Argues that philosophy can solve the midlife crisis, at least in one of its forms. This crisis turns on the exhaustibility of our ends. The solution is to value ends that are 'atelic,' so inexhaustible. Topics include: John Stuart Mill's nervous breakdown; Aristotle on the finality of the highest good; and Schopenhauer on the futility of desire.
Argues that philosophy can solve the midlife crisis, at least in one of its forms. This crisis turns on the exhaustibility of our ends. The solution is to value ends that are 'atelic,' so inexhaustible. Topics include: John Stuart Mill's nervous breakdown; Aristotle on the finality of the highest good; and Schopenhauer on the futility of desire.
Love and the Value of a Life, Philosophical Review 123 (July 2014)
Argues that there is no-one it is irrational to love; that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love; and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you are not required to save three instead of one, even when those you could save are perfect strangers.
Argues that there is no-one it is irrational to love; that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love; and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you are not required to save three instead of one, even when those you could save are perfect strangers.
Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism, Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, eds., Rational and Social Agency (Oxford 2014)
Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.
Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.
What is a Reason to Act?, Philosophical Studies 167 (January 2014)
Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, 'ought,' and evidence.
Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, 'ought,' and evidence.
Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts, Philosophical Issues 23 (October 2013)
Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good, Philosophers' Imprint 13 (May 2013)
Argues for an interpretation of Iris Murdoch on which her account of moral reasons has Platonic roots, and on which she gives an ontological proof of the reality of the Good. This reading explains the structure of Sovereignty, how Murdoch's claims differ from a focus on 'thick moral concepts,' and how to find coherent arguments in her book.
Argues for an interpretation of Iris Murdoch on which her account of moral reasons has Platonic roots, and on which she gives an ontological proof of the reality of the Good. This reading explains the structure of Sovereignty, how Murdoch's claims differ from a focus on 'thick moral concepts,' and how to find coherent arguments in her book.
Knowing How, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (October 2012)
Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
Transparency and Inference, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (July 2012)
Argues that doubts about the inference from p to I believe that p do not support reflective theories of self-knowledge over an inferential or rule-following view. (This note is a reply to Matthew Boyle, 'Transparent Self-Knowledge,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-241.)
Argues that doubts about the inference from p to I believe that p do not support reflective theories of self-knowledge over an inferential or rule-following view. (This note is a reply to Matthew Boyle, 'Transparent Self-Knowledge,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-241.)
Internal Reasons, Kieran Setiya and Hille Paakkunainen, eds., Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings (MIT 2012)
Argues that 'internalism about reasons' owes its appeal to a function argument from the nature of agency. Internalism is thus revealed as a species of ethical rationalism. (This paper introduces a volume of recent work on internal and external reasons.)
Argues that 'internalism about reasons' owes its appeal to a function argument from the nature of agency. Internalism is thus revealed as a species of ethical rationalism. (This paper introduces a volume of recent work on internal and external reasons.)
Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?, Philosophical Topics 38 (Spring 2010; published Fall 2011)
Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. Ends with tentative thoughts about the kind of epistemology that could respond to disagreement without scepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased towards the truth.
Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. Ends with tentative thoughts about the kind of epistemology that could respond to disagreement without scepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased towards the truth.
Knowledge of Intention, Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Fred Stoutland, eds., Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Harvard 2011)
Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of 'transparency' more familiar in connection with belief.
Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of 'transparency' more familiar in connection with belief.
Reasons and Causes, European Journal of Philosophy 19 (March 2011)
Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated – against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives – on broadly metaphysical grounds.
Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated – against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives – on broadly metaphysical grounds.
Sympathy for the Devil, Sergio Tenenbaum, ed., Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (Oxford 2010)
Argues that, while human beings may act 'under the guise of the good,' this is not true of rational agents, as such. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of Reasons without Rationalism – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.
Argues that, while human beings may act 'under the guise of the good,' this is not true of rational agents, as such. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of Reasons without Rationalism – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.
Practical Knowledge Revisited, Ethics 120 (October 2009)
Argues that the view propounded in 'Practical Knowledge' survives objections made by Sarah Paul ('Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking,' Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
Argues that the view propounded in 'Practical Knowledge' survives objections made by Sarah Paul ('Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking,' Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
Believing at Will, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (September 2008)
Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in 'Deciding to Believe,' attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in 'Deciding to Believe,' attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
Practical Knowledge, Ethics 118 (April 2008)
Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
Cognitivism About Instrumental Reason, Ethics 117 (July 2007)
Argues for a 'cognitivist' account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
Argues for a 'cognitivist' account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
Is Efficiency a Vice?, American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (October 2005)
Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
Explaining Action, Philosophical Review 112 (July 2003; published September 2004)
Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen 'under the guise of the good.' The argument turns on the need to explain the place of 'practical knowledge' – knowing what one is doing – in intentional action. (A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of Reasons without Rationalism.)
Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen 'under the guise of the good.' The argument turns on the need to explain the place of 'practical knowledge' – knowing what one is doing – in intentional action. (A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of Reasons without Rationalism.)
Against Internalism, Noûs 38 (June 2004)
Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of 'internalism'): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of 'internalism'): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
Intention, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (August 2009; revised July 2022)